The American Connection in China’s Military Purges — and Russia’s Challenge to Trump’s Nuclear Plans

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In January, Chinese authorities removed one of the country’s most powerful generals — 75-year-old Zhang Youxia, a close military ally of Xi Jinping, who was reportedly accused of passing secrets from China’s nuclear weapons program to the United States. According to an investigation by The Wall Street Journal, the allegations were presented at a closed-door meeting of the People’s Liberation Army’s senior leadership. Zhang was also suspected of accepting substantial bribes in exchange for military appointments and building political factions that undermined Xi’s authority. Zhang belonged to China’s revolutionary elite. His father had been a comrade of Xi Jinping’s father. Zhang himself fought in the war against Vietnam, commanded major military organizations, met Vladimir Putin, and maintained contacts with senior American officials. In August 2024, he hosted Jake Sullivan, then US national security adviser, in Beijing. Another name in the investigation was even more intriguing: Gu Jun, the former general manager of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). According to the WSJ, investigators uncovered information about the alleged transfer of Chinese nuclear secrets to the United States during their inquiry into Gu, linking the matter to Zhang Youxia. Gu had previously participated in negotiations with Russia’s Rosatom over the construction of nuclear facilities in China. The investigation had reached two of the most sensitive institutions in the Chinese state: the military high command and the nuclear industry. The scale of the purge was unprecedented. Investigators examined officers associated with Zhang and another dismissed general, Liu Zhenli, scrutinizing their appointments and professional connections.

According to the WSJ, thousands of military personnel may have come under investigation. If the allegations of American influence are true, Xi was facing a threat far more serious than corruption: the possible penetration of China’s military leadership by foreign interests, precisely as the country was rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. Chinese authorities have neither publicized nor confirmed the alleged transfer of secrets or American involvement. Officially, the generals were accused of violating political discipline, forming factions, and undermining the military command structure.

Of the seven members appointed to China’s Central Military Commission in 2022, only Xi Jinping and Zhang Shengmin remained in active office. Zhang Shengmin had previously overseen military discipline and anti-corruption investigations. Following the purges, he became Xi’s sole deputy in China’s highest military command and was also elevated to the Communist Party’s Politburo.

On November 3, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov arrived in China, immediately after these dramatic changes in the military leadership and just ahead of a possible summit between Putin, Trump, and Xi in Shenzhen on November 18–19. Preparations for a potential meeting of the three nuclear powers were underway. The American president had already proposed negotiations on nuclear disarmament. If Xi had indeed uncovered American influence inside his military command, the sequence makes sense. Before entering negotiations of such strategic importance, he would need to regain control of the armed forces, secure China’s most sensitive military secrets, and coordinate positions with Russia before sitting down with Trump.

Moscow and Beijing already share a position on one of Trump’s most ambitious military projects. Since May 2025, they have opposed the American Golden Dome program — a missile defense system designed to protect the United States against nuclear missile attacks. They see a dangerous paradox in the project: if Washington becomes capable of intercepting a substantial portion of a retaliatory nuclear strike, it may no longer fear the consequences of launching an attack of its own. That could increase the risk of nuclear war.

Russia has also been helping China strengthen its strategic defenses. Since 2019, Moscow has participated in the development of China’s missile attack early-warning system. At the time, only Russia and the United States possessed comparable integrated systems. The US Congress, meanwhile, sought to block Russian nuclear fuel deliveries to Chinese fast-neutron reactors, warning that the technology could help Beijing expand its stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium. The possible meeting between Putin, Trump, and Xi has already been dubbed a “New Yalta,” invoking the 1945 conference at which the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain negotiated the postwar world order. This time, the agenda could involve a new international security architecture, including the future of nuclear arms control.

Trump wants to negotiate limits with two powers that have already coordinated their opposition to America’s missile defense program. China refuses to accept the same restrictions as Russia and the United States, whose nuclear arsenals are considerably larger.

Moscow, meanwhile, insists that the nuclear forces of Britain and France must also be taken into account. The situation has become more dangerous since the New START treaty, which limited the strategic nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States, expired on February 5, 2026. The agreement capped each side at 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. No replacement treaty has been concluded. For the first time in half a century, the world’s two largest nuclear powers are operating without legally binding numerical limits on their strategic arsenals.

Xi Jinping, however, has no intention of turning the proposed meeting of the three powers into another round of negotiations over Ukraine. When German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier raised the subject during a recent meeting in Beijing, the Chinese leader, according to Steinmeier, made little effort to conceal his irritation. “He explicitly pointed out that this was a European conflict and that Europeans must have a seat at the negotiating table,” Steinmeier told ARD. In other words, Xi wants the Ukrainian question left to the Europeans, while his prospective meeting with Putin and Trump addresses a different, potentially more consequential global agenda.

And he may have good reasons for doing so. US special envoy Steve Witkoff has announced another round of negotiations between Russia, the United States, and Ukraine, scheduled for November 10–11 in Abu Dhabi. Among the stated objectives was a particularly revealing phrase: “post-war security arrangements.”
Post-war. The war is still raging. No peace agreement has been signed. Yet the American side already has a proposal for how security will be organized after the fighting ends. It increasingly looks as though the principal political terms of a Ukrainian settlement may already have been worked out behind closed doors, with the upcoming meetings intended to formalize and implement those understandings.

The diplomatic calendar reads almost like a script: first, the US elections. Then the Ukraine talks in Abu Dhabi. Next, a proposed Putin–Trump–Xi meeting at the APEC summit in China. American media have also reported Trump’s desire to arrange the signing of a Ukrainian peace agreement at the December G20 summit in Miami.

For Trump, a settlement in Ukraine could clear the way for negotiations at a much higher level — over nuclear weapons, strategic security, and the long-term relationship between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), an American think tank, views the proposed summit as an opportunity for Putin to restore Russia’s international standing. “He is now closer than ever to receiving the recognition he has long sought from the world’s two superpowers.” But Russia has far more concrete interests in meeting the leaders of the other two powers than diplomatic prestige.

Moscow wants a new strategic stability framework that takes into account American missile defenses, the nuclear forces of European powers, and threats to Russia’s own military infrastructure.

At the same time, it intends to preserve its partnership with China while keeping the door open to direct agreements with the United States. Washington may hope that improving relations with Russia will weaken Moscow’s strategic alignment with Beijing.

But Russia and China have spent years strengthening each other’s military capabilities — with tangible results. In September last year, Western journalists uncovered documents concerning Russian military equipment deliveries to China and the training of Chinese airborne units. Experts believe that this experience could prove valuable to Beijing in a potential military operation against Taiwan.

In July 2026, another investigation, conducted jointly by The Insider, Der Spiegel, and Le Monde, revealed documents from secret Russian-Chinese negotiations on joint missile defense, military artificial intelligence, and methods of countering Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite network. Russian and Chinese strategic bombers have also been conducting joint patrols near Japan, forcing Tokyo to scramble fighter jets.

For Washington, these developments present several interconnected problems. Taiwan lies at the heart of the US-China confrontation. Japan hosts American military bases. And Russia is helping Beijing develop technologies capable of complicating US military operations in the region.

Perhaps this is where the real significance of the proposed G3 lies. Moscow and Beijing are strengthening their own capabilities so that they do not have to choose between accepting American terms and entering another arms race.

Trump may be seeking an agreement that limits the capabilities of his rivals. But if Russia and China can continue reinforcing each other, Washington will have to take their demands into account.

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